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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN STRICT
LIABILITY CASESt
JAMES D. GHIARDI* and NATALIE B. KOEHN**
As products liability litigation has increased, so have the
claims for punitive damages.' Despite the enormous awards of
punitive damages in this area,2 neither the courts nor legal
writers3 have appreciably focused on the following issues:
(1) Whether the theory of punitive damages is consistent
with the doctrine of strict liability in Wisconsin.
(2) Whether a punitive damages award in a products liabil-
ity case is consistent with the aims of public policy.
UNDER WISCONSIN LAW, PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE INAPPROPRIATE IN
CASES OF STRICT LIABILTY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS.
The Wisconsin rule is clear: punitive damages will be
awarded only where the harm was inflicted "under circumstan-
ces of aggravation, insult or cruelty, with vindictiveness or mal-
ice," 4 or where the defendant acted in wanton, willful or reck-
less disregard of the plaintiffs rights.5 Where no actual malice
is shown, the character of the offense must have the outra-
geousness associated with a serious crime.' It is equally clear
that gross negligence, that is negligence involving willful or
reckless conduct, was abolished as a common law cause of ac-
t This comment is intended to supplexhent Professor Ghiardi's article, Punitive
Damages in Wisconsin, 60 MARQ. L. Rav. 753 (1977).
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
** Senior, Marquette University Law School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1. Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products Liability, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 300 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Tozer]; Note, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Products Lia-
bility Claims, 6 GA. L. REv. 613 (1972).
2. Cases involving the drug MER/29 resulted in over $20,000,000 of punitive dam-
ages claimed against one Chicago manufacturer alone. Tozer, supra note 1, at 301;
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 684, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) in
which $250,000 of punitive damages were awarded.
3. Comment, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA L.
Rv. 895 (1976); Snyman, The Validity of Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Cases, 44 INs. CoUNsEL J. 402 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Snyman]; Owen, Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MicH. L. Rav. 1258 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Owen].
4. McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424 (1854).
5. Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965).
6. Entzminger v. Ford Motor Co., 47 Wis. 2d 751, 177 N.W.2d 899 (1970); Jones v.
Fisher, 42 Wis. 2d 209, 166 N.W.2d 175 (1969).
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tion in Wisconsin by Bielski v. Schulze.7 Accordingly, a claim
for punitive damages is eliminated except in those cases involv-
ing intentional torts.8
We recognize the abolition of gross negligence does away with
the basis for punitive damages in negligence cases. But puni-
tive damages are given, not to compensate the plaintiff for his
injury, but to punish and deter the tortfeasor, and were ac-
quired by gross negligence as accouterments of intentional
torts. Willful and intentional torts, of course, still exist, but
should not be confused with negligence. (See sec. 481 p. 1260
Restatement 2 Torts) The protection of the public from such
conduct or from reckless, wanton, or willful conduct is best
served by the criminal laws of the state.'
The district court construing Wisconsin law in Drake v.
Wham-O Manufacturing Co., '0 disregarded the Bielski ration-
ale in denying a motion to dismiss the punitive damages allega-
tion. The court stated:
Where the principal claim is based on strict liability in tort
and there is an additional claim of wanton disregard of the
plaintiff's rights, it is a simple matter to allow the plaintiff
to make a supplementary showing of aggravating conduct for
the purpose of proving entitlement to punitive damages."
The Drake court reasoned that this was an appropriate ap-
proach since "a claim for punitive damages is considered a
prayer for a specific type of relief in Wisconsin, not a part of
the claim itself. .. ."
Despite the clear language in Bielski to the contrary, the
Drake court effectively regenerated gross negligence as a justifi-
cation for punitive damages in a case grounded on a negligence
per se theory. Judge Gordon's approach, which split the claim
for relief from the underlying cause of action, is counter not
only to Bielski, but to the strict liability theory of products
liability. 12
7. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
8. Walbrun v. Berkel, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
9. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 114 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1962).
10. 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974). See also Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916
(Tex. 1976).
11. 373 F. Supp. at 611; see Hawes v. General Motors, No. 76CP2551 (Hampton
County, S.C., filed March 12, 1976), unpublished order denying defendant's motion
to strike punitive damages claim from products liability cause of action.
11.1 373 F. Supp. at 611.
12. See Snyman, supra note 3, at 406.
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Wisconsin does not recognize an independent cause of ac-
tion for punitive damages. 13 Rather, punitive damages must
have a foundation of actual damages and specific aggravated
conduct to "attach or rest upon."" If punitive damages are to
be awarded in a negligence case, then the negligence itself must
take on the character or nature of aggravated conduct to pro-
vide the necessary foundation.' 5 It is precisely this characteris-
tic which Bielski expressly eliminated from a negligence action
and which the Drake decision recreated.
Strict liability as adopted in Wisconsin does not make the
manufacturer an insurer nor does it impose absolute liability
for a defective product.'" Rather, it relieves the plaintiff of
proving specific acts of negligence'7 and protects against cer-
tain defenses.'8 The liability arises not from any particular neg-
ligent act or finding of fault, but from the finding that a prod-
uct is unreasonably defective.' 9 Strict liability and negligence
theories are mutually exclusive and are to be pleaded in the
alternative.2" Both recovery theories, if properly pleaded, may
be submitted to the jury, but the final selection of special ver-
dict questions and instructions must await the conclusion of
the proof.2' In Howes v. Deere & Co.,22 the Wisconsin Supreme
13. Maxwell v. Kennedy, 50 Wis. 645, 7 N.W. 657 (1880).
14. Id. at 649, 7 N.W. at 658.
15. It is possible to make the argument that a different cause of action is created
when an element sustaining punitive damages is alleged. That is, in proving aggra-
vated conduct in a negligence action, no longer is the actionable conduct properly
characterized as negligence, but rather, it is classified as intentional conduct in light
of Bielski and not "strict" liability as known in Wisconsin. If such a metamorphosis is
allowed, the applicable statute of limitations in Wisconsin is decreased from three
years to two years. Wis. STAT. § 893.21 (1975).
16. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
17. Id.; Wis. J.I.-Civil No. 3260 states the necessary elements of proof are,
(A) product is in a defective condition
(B) defective condition made the product unreasonably dangerous to persons
or property
(C) defective condition existed when product was under the control of the
manufacturer
(D) product reached user without a substantial change in condition
See also RESTATEMENT (ScoaN) TORTS § 402A.
18. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 450, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58 (1967), notes that in
adopting a products liability theory, the defense of lack of privity of contract is no
longer applicable.
19. Id. at 459, 155 N.W.2d at 63.
20. See Wis. STAT. § 802.02(5)(b) (1975); Greiten v. La Dow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235
N.W.2d 677 (1975); Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976).
21. Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 272, 238 N.W.2d 76, 79 (1976).
22. 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976).
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Court consigned to the trial court's discretion the order and
form of the special verdict. The court's hesitation in establish-
ing a special verdict format where both strict liability and neg-
ligence are pleaded emanates from the distinctly different ele-
ments of proof required by each theory. 3
Punitive damages on the other hand, were developed 4 long
before the idea of holding a manufacturer liable for a defective
product became popular.25 They evolved in the context of a
one-on-one relationship and were viewed as a form of punish-
ment" - a deterrent for intentional and outrageous conduct.27
Unlike products liability where the liability is predicated on
the condition of the product and not the nature of the act, the
character of the act in a claim for punitive damages is para-
mount.
21
Federal District Judge Robert Warren recognized the incon-
sistency in doctrine and purpose and expressly countered the
Drake decision in Walbrun v. Berkel, Inc. 21 In this case plaintiff
claimed one million dollars in punitive damages as a result of
defendant's alleged wanton disregard for the safety and well-
being of plaintiff in the manufacture, design and assembly of
the product °.3 In granting defendant's motion to strike plain-
tiff's allegation relating to punitive damages, the district court
stated:
Punitive damages are of course recoverable in the inten-
tional tort type of case. . . . Examples of intentional tort
cases which permit the recovery of punitive damages include,
23. The decision as to whether to submit one question or two questions, and
the order of submission in the event of two questions is to be made by the trial
judge in each case. The reason it might be appropriate to submit both questions
on occasion is that the liability imposed in a negligence per se case is not based
upon a failure to exercise ordinary care with its necessary element of foresee-
ability, both common elements of an ordinary negligence case.
Id. at 273, 238 N.W.2d at 79 (citation omitted).
24. Punitive damages were first recognized in Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768
(1763). Wisconsin adopted punitive damages over 123 years ago in McWilliams v.
Bragg, 3 Wis. 424 (1854).
25. See Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IowA L. REv.
307 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Rice]. In 1975 a total of over one million claims were
filed totalling more than fifty billion dollars in value. Snyman, supra note 3, at 406.
26. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
27. See Ghiardi, Punitive Damages in Wisconsin, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 753, 774 (1977).
28. See Rice, supra note 25; Owen, supra note 3, at 1270.
29. 433 F. Supp. 384, 385 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
30. Id. at 384.
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inter alia, assault and battery, slander, libel, seduction, and
malicious prosecution ...
It therefore appears that punitive damages have been
eliminated in Wisconsin except for those cases involving in-
tentional torts. Plaintiff contends, however, that punitive
damages are recoverable in the more aggravated types of
product liability cases where it is alleged that the defendant
acted in wanton disregard for the safety and well-being of the
injured party. In this regard, plaintiff relies upon Drake v.
Wham-O Manufacturing Co.. . . In Drake, Judge Gordon
held that punitive damages are recoverable in product liabil-
ity cases where there is "a showing of wanton, willful or reck-
less disregard of the plaintiff's rights."31
Noting that the Drake court relied on Kink v. Combs,3" Judge
Warren stated:
This Court is not persuaded that Drake correctly applied
the Wisconsin punitive damage rule. The Kink case involved
the intentional torts of rape and assault and battery. The
somewhat ambiguous language in the Kink opinion to the
effect that the wanton, willful or reckless disregard of an-
other's rights gives rise to punitive damages must be con-
strued in the context of that case. Such conduct when viewed
in the context of a negligence case merely gives rise to "gross
negligence." In the case of negligent conduct, however aggra-
vating, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has expressly pre-
cluded the recovery of punitive damages."
Judge Warren's decision is clearly in line with existing Wiscon-
sin law that in the absence of intentional conduct punitive
damages are not to be awarded. Hopefully, in an appropriate
case the Wisconsin Supreme Court will put to rest the concept
that punitive damages may be recovered in a products liability
case based on strict liability and so-called aggravated conduct.
RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN A PRODUCTS LIArBILrY CASE
IS INCONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC POLICY
One of the most important foundations of the theory of
products liability is that the manufacturer is in a better posi-
tion to bear the losses and risks of defective products and to
31. Id. at 384-85 (citations omitted).
32. 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965).
33. 433 F. Supp. at 385, citing Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105
(1962).
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make an equitable distribution when losses do occur. 4 The
expense of products liability insurance is made a part of the
cost of doing business and is passed on to the consumer in the
form of higher prices for the product. 5
I Aside from the question of whether the standard products
liability policy insures against claims for punitive damages,"
it is asserted by some authorities,37 most notably those defend-
ing insurance companies and manufacturers, that such policy
coverage would violate public policy. 8 The argument as stated
in Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co.,39 is that allowing a com-
pany to insure itself against the punishment intended in a
punitive damages award defeats the purpose and effect of the
law.
A policy which permitted an insured to recover from the in-
surer fines imposed for violation of a criminal law would cer-
tainly be against public policy. The same would be true of a
policy which expressly covered an obligation of the insured to
pay a sum of money in no way representing injuries or losses
suffered by the plaintiff but imposed as a penalty because of
a public wrong.40
Characterized by one decision4' as analogous to insuring
against jail, a punitive damages recovery in a products liability
case results in punishing the public, not the wrongdoer.
Recently the Insurance Services Office announced its inten-
tion to specifically exclude coverage for punitive damages from
all personal and commercial liability insurance policies.2 This
reaction is largely in response to the growing number of juris-
dictions4 3 finding punitive damages coverage within the broad
language of the standard liability coverage provision. Insurance
Services Office concluded that the "punishment and deterrent
34. See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Snyman, supra
note 3, at 406.
35. Tozer, supra note 1, at 302.
36. J. GHIARDI, PERSONAL INJuRY DAMAGES IN WISCONSIN § 3.02, at 33-37 (Callaghan,
1964) [hereinafter cited as GmARDI].
37. See Tozer, supra note 1; Snyman, supra note 3; Rice, supra note 25.
38. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
39. 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941).
40. Id. at - , 18 A.2d at 359.
41. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1934).
42. J. of Com., Aug. 23, 1977, at 10, col. 1.
43. See GHLURDI, supra note 37, for an analysis of cases. See also Northwestern Nat'l
Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 61:245
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
effect to others of punitive damage awards would be defeated
by allowing individuals to insulate themselves from the possi-
bility of such punishment through the purchase of an insurance
contract.""
Deterrence is not even an effective argument for the plain-
tiff. Most certainly, the cost of increased insurance premiums
resulting from larger products liability awards will be part of
increased products prices." Those companies unable to pass on
costs or obtain products liability insurance will be forced out
of business. The economic argument against punitive damages
is that the plaintiff who receives punitive damages is also the
consumer who pays for the recovery and accordingly is ulti-
mately punished.46
CONCLUSION
The purpose in adopting strict liability was to create a
cause of action similar to negligence per se.47 By avoiding the
necessity of proving specific negligence, the injured plaintiff is
now able to recover more consistently from sellers who were
previously protected from suit by the sheer inability of the
plaintiff to trace back the product defect through layers of
retailers, wholesalers, distributors and jobbers." With a claim
for punitive damages, the necessity to prove an intentional act
on the part of the seller reappears - effectively eliminating
strict liability as the basis for a cause of action.49
To date, no court has awarded punitive damages in a prod-
ucts liability case in the absence of a showing of aggravated
conduct. The abolition of gross negligence in Wisconsin, how-
ever, precludes a claim for punitive damages where the cause
of action is grounded in negligence or negligence per se.
Even in those states that recognize gross negligence as the
basis for an award of punitive damages, such an award in a
products liability case is inconsistent with the strict liability
theory of liability and clearly contrary to the public policy basis
for the doctrine.
44. J. of Com., Aug. 23, 1977, at 10, col. 1.
45. See Owen, supra note 3. See also Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled
Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870 (1976).
46. Tozer, supra note 1.
47. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
48. Wis. J. I. - CIviL, No. 3200.
49. Tozer, supra note 1.
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